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STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OR STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR DEFENSE?
James J. Tritten & Nancy C. Roberts
In military organizations planning is a finely tuned art if
not a well developed science. Each major organization in the
military establishment has planning sub organizations. Some
indulge in "wish list" planning, some are involved with long-
range planning, some concern themselves with the near-term
planning cycles of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS), some with war and campaign planning, and others
with specific weapons systems or types of forces. Still other
planning organizations in the Department of Defense (DoD) include
planning portfolios on mobilization, the industrial base, rules
of engagement, military exercise programs, and crisis responses.
Despite the wide spectrum of these efforts and the human and
material resources devoted to the planning process, we constantly
hear about the need for more thorough and precise planning within
DoD. Whatever planning is currently being envisaged and
developed, however heroic the effort, apparently is viewed as
unsatisfactory. We have, it would seem, a major "planning gap."
Planning Gap
This planning gap is difficult to describe. What exactly is
missing from our planning systems that provokes calls for more or
better planning? One view, and the one we present in this paper,
is that the planning gap represents a lack of coordinated effort
to integrate DoD's major goals, policies and action sequences
into a cohesive whole. It is the lack of a mechanism to marshal
and then allocate DoD's resources into a unique and viable
posture based on its relative internal competencies and
shortcomings, anticipated changes in the environment, and
contingent moves by intelligent opponents. What is missing is
not long-range planning, nor is it the "silent P" of PPBS, but
the planning that integrates DoD's disparate internal units into
a coherent entity.
The business world uses the phrase strategic management or
strategic planning (we will use these terms interchangeably
throughout the paper) to describe the effort to integrate an
organization's major goals, policies and action sequences into a
cohesive whole. The concern is with managing the whole
enterprise, not just its functional components or its sub parts.
It is the challenge of the organizational leader (referred to as
the general manager in business and industry) to direct the
efforts and activities of the other members of the organization
and to integrate the functional components toward the successful
completion of the organization's stated mission and purpose.
In comparison to other types of planning, strategic
management also analyzes an organization's external environment
and internal climate, and searches for new trends,
discontinuities, surprises, and competitive advantages. Since its
scope is broader than other types of planning, it typically
embodies more qualitative shifts in direction than anticipated
from the long-range planning process. Also guided by an
idealized vision of the future, strategic management tends to be
much more action oriented. The organization attempts to keep its
options open, considering a variety of possible alternatives to
respond promptly to unforeseen contingencies as it moves toward
its ideal.
Long-range planning, in contract, focuses more on specifying
goals and objectives and translating them into current budgets
and work programs. The objective of long-range planners (and
short-range planners for that matter) is to work backward from
goals to programs and budgets so as to map out the sequence of
decisions and actions required necessary to achieve the desired
future embodied in the goals. Long-range planning, as a
consequence, assumes that current trends will continue and plans
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tend to be linear extrapolations of the present.
From our observations, we believe that the current emphasis
in DoD is on planning, both long-range and short-range planning,
and not on strategic planning nor strategic management. For
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example, the Joint Staff Officers Guide issued by the Armed
Forces Staff College, describes the Joint Strategic Planning
System as coping with a series of six primary planning documents
with direct ties to the PPBS. The armed forces, tend to view
planning as either deliberate or time sensitive, driven by
requirements or capabilities, and organized on a global,
regional, or functional basis; not with planning for managing the
total system, however that system is defined. In sum, we view
the planning gap as deriving from a lack of coordinated efforts
to integrate DoD's major goals, policies and action sequences
into a coherent whole.
Evidence of the planning gap can be be found in four major
criticisms of DoD planning: DoD's strategic goals and objectives
lack clarity; it has a functional organizational design which
impedes mission integration; it overemphasizes budgets and
programming needs to the detriment of overall policies and
strategies; and it tends to ignore its competitors and the
external environment.
Lack of clarity of strategic goals. Inattention to mission-
oriented strategic planning at the Washington headguarters level
has dimmed the clarity of DoD's strategic goals. The stated
goals are ambiguous and vague and vary depending on whether one
is planning to support programming, deliberate. crisis, or war
planning. The general international goals of United States
foreign policy have probably not changed since World War II.
Despite this consistency in obvious national goals, there is
often a lack of agreement among the military Services and between
the Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) and the Washington headguarters
over what the national goals should be in a crisis or in the
allocation of forces during a major multi-theater conflict with
the USSR. Making the connection between political goals and
military capabilities is central to sound strategic planning and
advice to decision-makers.
Washington headguarters must be involved in setting national
goals. Complicating this imperative is that a future war is
likely to be fought under an alliance structure (i.e. NATO)
rather than alone. Washington's major role in a global war may
actually be that of allocating resources to alliance military
organizations and remaining national theater commanders.
In an international organization such as DoD, the clear
articulation of overall strategic goals in peace or war can play
an important role in coordinating allied efforts toward , these
goals. Clarity enhances efficiency and capability, and without
this unifying mechanism, DoD loses the benefits that integration
can bring.
DoD has been criticized widely, and incorrectly, for not
having a strategy. The lack of a strategy has not been the
problem. DoD needs a well designed and highly interactive
strategic planning process that involves more than just military
capabilities. We see a need for an integrated process, not only
internal to DoD, but integrated in terms of the entire Executive
Branch and all of its agencies and offices. Yet a major problem
exists in that our organizational systems were designed to be
decentralized, both in the Executive Branch and in DoD. Ad hoc
coordination rather than institutionalized integration has been
the the norm. The challenge has been and continues to be
achieving integration within a system that was designed to be as
decentralized as possible, to avoid the dangers inherent in
centralized authority, especially centralized military authority.
Functional Organizational Design. The principal
organizations of the Washington headquarters of DoD are the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) headed by the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff headed by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Military Departments
each headed by a Service Secretary and a career military officer
who also is a member of the JCS. These Washington organizations
focus primarily on functional areas, such as manpower, tactical
air forces, armor, submarines. Each agency in the DoD Washington
headguarters also maintains its own duplicate organizations for
each of the functional areas for which it has forces.
Each Military Department has multiple and separate
headguarters staffs: the Secretariat serving the Service
Secretary and the military headguarters staff supporting the
Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations. This arrangement
results in unnecessary layers of supervision and duplication of
effort. The separate staffs lead to unnecessary supervision,
delays, micro-management, and inefficiency. Organization along
functional lines makes OSD micro-management easier. Some of these
problems have been resolved by recent reorganization and
consolidation. The organization of Military Departments reflects
an earlier era when the Service Secretaries headed separate,
cabinet-level departments which is no longer true.
Organization by function inhibits integration of Service
capabilities along coordinated mission lines. This in turn
hinders the attainment of a primary goal when DoD was created in
1947; roles and mission integration. Headguarters organizational
activity strives for functional efficiency and management and
control of functional activities, not on overall politico-
military and warfighting missions and objectives.
Perhaps the best example of the DoD orientation is that
material inputs, not mission outputs, are emphasized. While DoD
exists to maintain and employ the Armed Forces, including timely
and effective actions to ensure the security of the United
States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests, the
general focus of its Washington headquarters is not on war-
fighting. The focus on operational missions, where the Armed
Forces may actually have to compete with an adversary, is lost in
the functional orientation. At the end of a day of military
strategic planning, it is quite likely that no mention is made
of another country. The focus more likely has been on programs,
budgets, and obstacles.
Corporate-like strategic planning at DoD headquarters is
inhibited by this lack of overall organizational focus on major
missions and strategic goals. Planning is undertaken to support
organizational positions vis-a-vis Congress, the Office of
Management and Budget, the Secretary or his staff, the JCS or the
Joint Staff, or other Services. Service interests and
programming rather than overall strategic needs play the dominant
roles in shaping planning decisions.
Tradeoffs are seldom made between different capabilities or
programs of discrete Services that can contribute to an overall
DoD mission. For example, Air Force officers might find it
difficult to get accolades for suggesting that destruction of
enemy targets could be more effectively performed by Navy
missiles than by land-based bombers.
Routine functions that support other Services, especially
airlift, sealift, or close air support, which are not central to
a Service's own definition of its missions, tend to be neglected.
The best example of this is the attention devoted to strategic
sealift. Tongue-in-cheek suggestions have been made that perhaps
the Army would be better served by having its own fleet! In
defense of the Reagan Administration, furnishing the afloat
forces for strategic sealift mission was recently elevated to one
of the Navy's primary missions.
Non-traditional contributions to war-fighting missions
outside the normal area for each Service (e.g., Air Force
contributions to sea control) have not always been pursued.
Interoperability and coordination reguirements of forces from the
separate Services, who must be able to operate together, are not
readily identified. Again, to the credit of the Reagan
Administration, some cross-service cooperation has occurred in
the last eight years.
Headquarters organizations have been accused of being out of
touch with the operational, especially readiness, requirements
of the Unified, Specified, and Allied commanders who actually
direct combat. Although the public perceives that the Service
Chiefs or the JCS direct wars, and despite the press coverage of
recent crisis management and the opportunities afforded by modern
communications systems, war-fighting is directed by Allied and
national CinCs in the field, not from the Washington
headquarters. Until a more appropriate balance is struck between
functional and mission orientation in the Washington headquarters
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of DoD, effective mission integration will remain limited and
flawed.
Overemphasis on Programming and Budgets. DoD suffers from
the predominance of routine organizational activity during the
programming and budgeting phases of the resource allocation
process. As a result, the attention of DoD senior civilian and
military officials is on near term issues and inputs rather than
outputs . Consequently, insufficient attention is paid to
corporate-type strategic planning, war planning, operation
matters, and execution and implementation of policy decisions.
The DoD Secretary, the critical civilian link in the chain of
command, and one of only two individuals who constitute the
National Command Authority, probably pays insufficient attention
to planning for his wartime and other operational
responsibilities
.
Comparing the numbers of officers and civilians assigned to
programming functions in the various Washington headquarters with
those assigned to war planning or long-range planning, the bias
can actually be documented. Arguably, in a war, many of these
officers would transfer to allied military organizations or to
the CinCs. It is not self-evident, however, that the skills of
national Service programmers are transferable to conduct allied
or joint wars and campaigns; hence, even if this large
population of programmers was shifted in time of war, the
necessary experience and background might be lacking.
For example, programmers generally are officers concerned
with the acquisition of weapons systems. Programming has failed
if the weapon is not going to be procured. Serious planning for
divestiture rarely takes place inside any bureaucracy. Campaign
and war planners, however, always must address tactical,
operational, and strategic withdrawls and defeats when doing
their contingency planning. Military planning for war is not
simply managing a series of territorial acquisitions.
Even within the category of programming, emphasis is
generally accorded to the purchase of major weapons systems and
not for routine and mundane materials required to sustain actual
combat operations. Simply put, the "star" performers are
assigned to acquire "sexy" new weapons systems, not bullets and
beans. Questions concerning mobilization requirements for long-
conventional conflict or civil defense preparations are generally
relegated to second and third level offices.
The overemphasis on programming and the underemphasis on
planning for operational matters are reflected in the
professional development of military officers. The development
of perceptive planning and decisive execution skills needed in
wartime has received a low priority in the resource-oriented
Services; technical, managerial and bureaucratic skills are
rewarded instead. We think this imbalance between headquarters
staff functions and Allied/CinC operations is a major illogical
discontinuity, and it is certainly a major difference with
industry where line operations tend to be emphasized and
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theoretically have the power to set corporate strategic
direction.
The gathering of data on one's own capabilities is another
issue related to the overemphasis on programming and budgeting
and the lack of attention to strategic planning. DoD's inability
to agreed upon capabilities and data bases of its own forces
contributes to planning problems. Programmers need capability
assessments to reflect those in systems specifications. War
planners must have realistic assessments of own force
capabilities. Yet every service is guilty in this area. Air
Force estimates for manned bomber penetration have always been
seriously questioned by outsiders. The kill rates each U.S.
submarine must attain against Soviet combined arms forces in
"bastions" are higher than most outside analysts would concede.
The ability of ground forces to hold turf in Europe has been
politicized to the point that models exist to support anyone's
biases. The result is that DoD is unable to gather trustworthy
information on its own forces.
Lack of an External Focus. Because of the attention on
programming and budgeting and the functional orientation of DoD,
the focus on operational missions where the Armed Forces may
actually have to compete with an adversary is often neglected.
Most business people understand that the environment in which
they operate is competitive. One can make the same case for the
international environment; the Soviet Union is a political actor
representing a distinct ideology competing with democratic
governments representing capitalism and free enterprise. Whereas
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the Soviets understand this competition and are actively engaged
on many fronts, who is in charge of the competition at our end?
It is rare to find coordinated international responses to
Soviet political-military competition. While we can learn from
business and industry how difficult it is to strategically manage
the complex, modern corporation, those of us schooled in foreign
affairs or international relations still tend to view nations as
single actors; the United States will do this or that and the
Soviet Union may respond in the following way. Yet the reality of
modern international affairs is that while government might be
implementing one plan, businesses may be effecting others that
could be the antithesis of the government's position.
The world international political and economic environment
constitutes a major input to the planning process. Accurately
forecasting the future is obviously difficult. Within the DoD,
the major agencies charged with such tasks -- the intelligence
services -- are too narrowly focused on military matters to
provide adeguate advice to the Secretary, the President, and the
Congress. Emphasis is needed in the full range of methodologies
available to explore alternative futures. Corporate strategic
planners appear to use a much broader horizon for considering
alternative futures, perhaps due to economic incentives. Thus,
if the private sector is doing the serious work in futures, then
government strategic planning must involve them or be prepared to
develop their own groups internally.
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Strategic Planning and Its Obstacles
Having briefly summarized the criticisms of current
planning activity within DoD, the guestion logically follows:
How can we fill this planning gap? There are substantive
obstacles to overcome to make strategic planning a viable option
for DoD. The sheer size of DoD makes strategic planning a
daunting prospect. Reporting to the Secretary, there are
twelve major defense agencies, eight major DoD field activities,
the Chairman of the JCS, ten Unified and Specified combat
commands, three (four if you count the Marine Corps) Military
Departments, and thirty-three major officials within OSD. In war,
one additional uniformed Service would come under DoD, the Coast
Guard. Over five million active duty, reserve and civilian
employees work directly for, and over three million additional
personnel in the private sector provide services or products
to, DoD.
The DoD has some 1265 military installations and properties
with 870 in the U.S., 375 overseas in 21 countries, and 20 in
U.S. territories. One guarter of all active duty military
personnel are stationed outside of U.S. The FY-88 DoD budget
included $290. 8B budget authority reguested and $285. 5B budget
outlays expected; roughly 5.7% of GNP, 26.1% of federal outlays,
or 17% of net public spending. Also included under DoD's aegis
are just under $7B in foreign military sales, $906M in foreign
government grant aids, and $56M in international military
training and education.
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What all these figures comprise point to is a pictograph
of the largest and most complex organization in the free world.
In business jargon, DoD is a very large multi-national
corporation, with an extremely diverse portfolio. How can
anyone or any single group strategically manage an enterprise of
this size?
In contrast, Exxon, the premier Fortune 500 company, has
around 139,000 employees, and sales only half of DoD outlays.
Even AT&T at its largest, in 1982, had fewer than one million
employees before its breakup. Planning in large diversified
companies like these tends to be at the divisional level, while
corporate activity is focused on "balancing the portfolio" of
interests and businesses. There is no comparable effort in
American business which would serve as a guide to the strategic
planning for an organizational entity such as DoD.
Approaching the challenge of strategic planning from smaller
organizational units, what is the appropriate organizational
level? If we take the Navy alone, it is still a large
organization. The Department of the Navy is a major military
department, with the legacy of once having been a cabinet-level
organization. The Secretary of the Navy, or the Chief of Naval
Operations, has forty-four major organizations reporting to him,
including two full military services (increasing to three in time




Current Navy long-range planning efforts (OPNAV Instruction
5000), acknowledge that strategic planning is critically
important for the future, while recognizing that decentralized
planning is the norm. This Navy effort at planning provides
programmers with a justification in the form of "Master Plans"
for families of weapons systems. This proves helpful in dealing
with OSD, the White House, and Congress, as the North American
Air Defense Master Plan did for the Air Force. Yet it is also a
high risk strategy, since such plans can be used against the
Navy as well. Former Navy Secretary John Lehman did not provide
Congress with supporting analysis to justify 600 ships, relying
instead on that number having been generated by the 1980
Republican Party platform. Unfortunately, what OPNAV Instruction
5000 focuses on is specific programs not on the overall
strategic planning for the Navy as an integrated organization.
Perhaps we should concern ourselves with strategically
managing even smaller and smaller organizational units. After
all, business and industry rarely successfully conduct strategic
management at the corporate level, but instead tend to manage
strategically at the divisional level, if at all. But what should
that level be? If we select smaller and smaller organizations
or units, do we not violate the very principles that started this
effort in the first place -- greater integration and coordination
of the whole defense effort through some kind of strategic
management process?
How can we apply strategic management principles to a system
that is decentralized, made up of semi-autonomous units, which
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ideally should coordinate their efforts, but practically
because of their size, their separate traditions, and the
American culture which insists on shared power among the major
branches of government -- probably will have enormous difficulty
in doing so? How, and with what means and mechanisms, can we
develop an integrated Defense policy? What will it take to get
us there?
Other Considerations.
In applying strategic planning to DoD there are other
considerations that suggest the road to greater DoD policy
integration will be difficult. One of the major questions that
comes to mind is "Who should do the strategic planning for DoD?"
The military has been criticized for failing to provide sound
military advice that crosses Service boundaries. The Secretary
often has resorted to using civilians, qualified or not, for
advice on issues for which military recommendations should
have been demanded. The military was quick to criticize the
direction of the Vietnam War from the OSD but proved incapable of
reorganizing to provide the Secretary and the President with the
policy recommendations and politically astute leadership required
at the Washington headquarters level.
When politico-military leadership was provided, it
frequently came from the ranks of individuals who lacked
educational backgrounds or experience in national security
affairs. The assumption is totally false that any good staff
officer should be able to fill such strategy positions, even if
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his Washington headquarters experience was in programming (or
lacking altogether). The selection of Admiral William J. Crowe
as Chairman of the JCS was a welcome exception but one man alone
cannot make up for deep-rooted institutional deficiencies.
While civilian control of the military remains a national
objective, there is no clear division of work between civilian
and military officials and organizations. The National Security
Council Staff, the State Department, and OSD contain many serving
military officers. Providing military advice to civilian
officials is not problematic, but military officers have been
placed into positions normally considered political appointments.
In addition, problems are inevitable with the quality of DoD
strategic planning or politico-military personnel seconded to
political appointee positions, the Service Secretariats, joint
duty military positions and, especially, duty assignments with
Allied military organizations. Political appointees are a
concern because of their relative inexperience (in some cases),
high turnover rates, and uncertain tenure.
Currently, extended periods of on-the-job training attempt
to substitute officers for a military officer's education and
previous experience in strategic planning. For over forty
years, DoD has given insufficient attention to the development
of officers capable of effectively performing politico-military
and strategic planning duty assignments. Substantial
disincentives persist to making such duty a career path.
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Strategic planning education and training have been
addressed by the Congress as well as the DoD since the passage of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The recent emphasis on "joint"
education misses the mark since it addresses only part of the
problem. Although efforts to improve "joint" education and
training are welcomed and move us in the appropriate direction,
they do not address more advanced concepts of strategic planning.
If we assume that military personnel should be more
involved in strategic planning, to what extent should their
efforts be co-joined with other strategic planning experts?
Should the planning be conducted with in-house assets or should
some planning responsibilities be contracted out to rely upon the
undeniable talents found in the private sector.
The Navy prefers to have serious planning done in-house,
preferably by personnel in uniform. The State Department is
similarly biased. The Navy does have outside "experts" brought
into the system from time to time, such as those in the Chief of
Naval Operations Executive Panel; but once those "experts" have
left, complete staffing and execution of plans is done by
uniformed officers. Many active duty officers intuitively
distrust civilian think tanks (even the Center for Naval
Analyses) and defense contractors. State Department regional
experts likewise have little use for outsiders who have never
experienced field work inside the system.
On the other hand, OSD appears biased in the opposite
direction, placing perhaps pathetic faith in external studies.
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OSD ad hoc, study groups, and Blue Ribbon panels abound and
proliferate. Certainly the final decisions are made by
officeholders, but participation by outsiders appears to be the
norm, diluting the active duty military officer's role in OSD and
reducing it to managing contracts rather than actual long-range
or strategic planning.
Who should do strategic planning involves decisions on where
that planning is to be done. If war planning is performed at the
CinC staff level, it is probably best that military personnel
take the lead. Some CinCs, however, cannot do all their planning
without the participation of non-military agencies, Allied
governments, and the private sector. For example, serious
planning by Transportation Command must involve more than just
military personnel.
Yet can the government do serious strategic planning with
the private sector? If industry is involved, can this be done
without conflict of interest? There is a definite bias by some
personnel in uniform to keep strategic planning divorced from
government contracting types, perceived as having an interest
only in turning a profit. Tough conflict of interest laws
discourage a strong interaction between contractors and
government employees.
However, some of the best strategic planning minds in the
country are outside of government. To believe that strategic
planning can be done without active participation by the private
sector is to deprive the government of a wealth of talent.
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Despite the reality of active cooperation between the private
sector and government at the highest levels of DoD, the services
have taught strategic planning from the purblind perspective of
the Joint Strategic Planning System -- all planning is to be done
on the inside. The myth is perpetuated by case studies and texts
ignoring the private sector contributions. War college curricula
focus on historical and military strategy, and an understanding
of defense organization; rarely addressing concepts found in the
Harvard Business Review .
There will always be a need for in-house planners with
access to certain types of sensitive classified material, and
limitations on the release of war plans and actual war planning
concepts. Since the military executes war plans, which are
strategic plans, then in-house personnel must bridge the gap
between military capabilities and political desires.
Is there a role for strategic planning at the Military
Department level, or should it be done by Allied military
organizations, the CinCs, and the JCS? The answer is difficult.
The services must train, educate, and designate strategic
planners who wear their uniforms but strategic planning is done
above the service level. If we shift all strategic planning to
Allied staffs, the CinCs, JCS, and OSD, then do we have the same
problem in programming? How do diversified corporations handle
similar problems? Many major corporations avoid corporate-level
strategic planning for mission integration. They do, however,
have extremely good strategic planning cells at the division
level.
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Another consideration regarding strategic planning in DoD is
deciding whether planning should be a continuous effort or
aperiodic? If done continually, where should it begin? with
the goals of the organization, the threat, the resources
available? There is no real consensus on how to start the
planning effort, yet obviously there are logical starting points
for different planners.
For war planners, a logical starting point is assessing
available resources. For programming planners, a logical
starting point is the set of desired goals. Often, experience
dictates the actual starting point to be current resources, as
expressed in the budget, although the formal Joint Strategic
Capabilities Planning System officially starts with the threat.
As a starting point the threat is very often the focus of
corporate strategic planners. Like their business counterparts,
politico-military planners tend to focus on threats -- the Soviet
Union --but too often are criticized for an obsession with only
this threat.
Running counter to the military desire to actually
strategically plan is the natural tendency by political
leadership to vacillate, obfuscate goals, and cloud objectives to
keep options open. It is not that political leaders are
incapable of articulating goals and objectives, but rather to
recognize that once they do, the vast federal bureaucracy
automatically reacts and attempts to attain those specific
objectives. Political leaders recognize that goals often do not
21
have clearly defined objectives that are helpful in a programming
system that may measure in decades the transition from concept
7
to full operational capability for a major weapons system.
If strategic planning is done continually, what prevents it
i
from becoming a routine standard operating procedure which those
in the line organizations fail to take seriously? A failing of
the Joint Strategic Planning System is that it is so
bureaucratic, crusty, and regularized that creative thinking may
be neither appreciated nor desired. Yet, if strategic planning
is not regularized but instead done in spurts, what is the
detection mechanism for the need to change? Often, a signal is a
changing threat. In the political-military world, changes in
plans (and even the planning process) are a logical outgrowth of
changes in the political leadership of the country. Program
planners change plans and the execution of plans once the budget
process has run its full course. War planners change plans
during the plan approval process and the integration of
individual CinC's plans with others.
Planning does not necessarily mean that plans (or even
operations) will be completed successfully. Poor planning can
derogate both the vision of a plan and its execution. The inter-
war years provide excellent case studies of poor analysis
(estimates of strategic bombing damage following World War I)
that were perpetuated and resulted in faulty plans, poor
recommendations for programs, fatuous political decisions, and
imperfect execution of plans. 8
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Other British inter-war examples, however, demonstrate that
good planning can be done at the inter-agency level. Planning by
industry, the Royal Navy, and the Ministry of Defense before the
outbreak of hostilities indicates that pre-war preparation is
useful. In each critical decision, however, an external threat
9
signal was sent and caused a revision of planning estimates.
Throughout history, all military organizations, like all
large organizations, are noted for their inertia and resistance
to change. The U.S. military establishment is no different
regarding resistance to change. However, in DoD, this tendency
is magnified by certain systemic problems, discussed previously.
Key among these is the inability to avoid roles and missions
disputes despite bureaucratic agreements among the Services which
should have solved them; the Key West Agreement, the Unified
Command Plan, and other JCS Publications and agreements being key
examples
.
As a result of these systemic problems, DoD has no effective
mechanisms for change; it cannot correct certain deficiencies on
its own. Despite frequent substantial evidence of poor
performance, DoD, like most organizations, expends much of its
energy on defending the status quo. The absence of an effective
process of internal self-correction and self-modification has
caused an undesirable rigidity in DoD organization and
procedures, and generated further Congressional intervention.
Related to insufficient mechanisms for internally generated
change is the absence of useful feedback from and to many
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activities in DoD. This particular criticism seems astounding to
the average line officer since so much of his time is consumed
with the compilation and reporting of information to seniors in
the chain of command. Effective management control is not
possible without useful and timely feedback on actual operations
and implementation of plans. There is a strong need to simplify
gathering data and to find a mechanism to simplify it's
presentation to key decision-makers.
Complicating data gathering in strategic planning is the
existence of "proprietary" information. Although we will fight
any future war in Europe under the command of long-established
Allied military organizations and in conjunction with Allies, not
all the Allies have been willing to share information with each
other in peacetime. France, for example, maintains a war-ready
stockpile of materials and supplies but the United States cannot
obtain the contents of those reserves and therefore conduct
adequate pre-war planning for mobilization needs. Over the
years,' numerous Allies have asked whether forces normally
assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command would "swing" to Europe in
the event of a war, only to receive conflicting responses.
The absence of useful feedback reduces management control of
the planning and the resource allocation processes. It also
precludes learning important lessons from poor staff preparation
and inadequate organizational performance. Past mistakes do not
receive the critical analysis and review that might prevent them
from recurring. DoD has a tradition of comprehensive, critical,
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and internal evaluation of its own performance in many areas of
politico-military affairs. Rather than concentrate on the
outcome of crises in which military forces were used, most flag
and general officers prefer to discuss the number of times a
particular force was employed. The proper measure of
effectiveness would be whether the use of force, or that
particular force, had an effect on the long-term outcome of the
crisis. Flag officers should become more familiar with the
types of forces that proved useful in attaining short-term and
long-run political goals than with how often the fleet was used.
Conclusions
Much thinking passes for strategic planning/management.
The emphasis is on "thinking grand thoughts" or conceptualizing
in a broad macro sense. Some techniques for strategic thinking
are expert opinion and the delphi technique. Expert opinion is
available to virtually everyone; i.e. books such as former
President Richard Nixon's new work 1999 or Zbigniew Brzezinski's
Game Plan . Interestingly, both books actually contain
comprehensive plans of action to manage the competitive inter-
state relationship. These are recommendations from experts who
have a vision of "the problem", a desired future, and are willing
to share it with the public for the price of a book. There will
always be a venue for authors and consultants but merely thinking
through a problem is not enough.
Much analysis also passes for strategic planning/management.
Analysis emphasizes alternatives and the consequences of
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alternative courses of action. Moving from thinking into
analysis, we use modern analytic tools in addition to expert
judgment to develop alternative futures, alternative courses of
action, and consequences. Cross-impact matrices are created to
show the relationship of variables. Simple trend extrapolation
is used to predict short-term futures. Scenario building can be
used as a stand-alone methodology or as an input for games and
simulations which help analysts in prediction, sensitivity and
contingency analysis. An example of analysis is the recently
published Discriminate Deterrence and the National Security
Strategy of the U.S. . There will always be a need for
analysis, but the analysis of a problem is still not enough.
Much planning also passes for strategic planning/management.
Planning is logical exercise that works backward from goals to
programs and budgets so as to map out the sequence of decisions
and actions required to achieved a desired future embodied in the
goals. Planning can be done on different levels: crisis
planning, deliberate planning, short-term planning, mid-term
planning, long-range planning, planning in support of PPBS,
planning in support of campaign and war plans, global planning,
regional planning, national planning and functional planning, all
of which are used in DoD. There always will be a need for
planning, however planning is still not enough.
DoD needs strategic planning/management. We earlier defined
strategic planning/management as the management and integration
of the total organization or system in pursuit of common goals
and a coherent strategy. While thinking, analyzing, and
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planning are important components, strategic planning/management
also includes the execution phase, where the strategy and
ultimately the plan is managed, implemented, monitored, and then
modified whenever necessary, based on new information,
opportunities or threats.
Yet military officers are not comfortable with strategic
planning/management. While they perform all of the elements
required -- thinking, analysis, planning, and management -- their
efforts are not coordinated nor integrated, and their work tends
to be segmented, focusing on one of these components without
linking them to the others. For example, the focus of the
planning education at war colleges often includes the execution
phase but usually from a historical perspective, not necessarily
from that of the general manager who has to integrate and
coordinate an entire organizational effort.
A sub-set of the military planning community did not always
address successful execution of plans; the plan was generally
considered to be a finished product. This was a major criticism
of military planning under the Carter Presidency; defense of the
United States was viewed as being best achieved by deterrence
which, in turn, was thought best achieved by the ability to
punish aggression. Serious nuclear war-fighting plans were given
scant attention. Carter-era military and political leaders were
criticized for failing to think through "what is required if
deterrence fails"?
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Under the Reagan administration, the military addressed the
execution of war plans; leading, in turn, to criticism of plans
to fight and win nuclear wars. To mollify critics, the
Commander-in-Chief himself declared that there could be no
winners in a nuclear war. Yet military planners needed to think
i
through all the options, including victory, so that they would be
able to offer sound military advice when required.
Planning is in evidence in the programming side of military
where the DoD is executing plans every day of the year. Due to
the long time for concept formulation, contracting, research and
development, testing and evaluation, manufacture, and fielding
new weapons systems, long-range planning is required and done in
the field of programming. The services also do an adequate job
of educating future program managers in concepts of program
management, but generally without the political-military
background that would let them understand why forces are required
in the first place. The lack of crossover to the policy side
that would connect these activities to DoD's goals, objectives,
and strategies is astonishing.
Military programming also tends to view the pure politico-
military planner as afloat in an unconstrained dream world
creating a wish list for what they would like if they could have
it all. The politico-military planner actually creates such
lists, but another group of them is engaged solely on current or
near-term plans that depend totally upon the output of the
programming process. The disconnect appears to be in the front
end - between determining requirements and creating programs.
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Thus, the DoD has been criticized widely for its lack of
planning, poor planning, and for poor implementation of plans.
We have suggested in this paper, however, that it is not
planning, per se, that is the problem. What is missing, from our
perspective, is a mechanism to integrate the current efforts and
the elements of thinking, analysis, planning, and management into
an integrated whole. Drawing on business and industry, we have
argued that the basic principles of strategic management are a
way to address the planning gap and serve as a unifying mechanism
to build the whole.
What can be done? To start, those of us in military
organizations, together with experts from industry, must begin a
dialogue on these issues. The leading roles should belong to
those military academic organizations already charged with the
education and training of Service planners.
Letting civilian academic organizations take a leading role
would likely result in overemphasis on current political science
or business school methods, and lack of attention to the
combination of both that would meet the needs of DoD. Although
many aspects of nuclear strategic planning can be found at
civilian universities, the type of strategic planning we have
discussed is not being addressed by civilian political science
nor history departments.
When civilian schools teach strategic planning, they tend to
focus on international or national political or social science
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aspects, nuclear strategic planning and arms control, defense
organization, or historical military strategy. The DoD needs
strategic planners/managers who can manage at the regional or
CinC level with an appreciation of strategic planning and
management concepts currently taught at business schools.
Military academic institutions offer faculties with unique
in-government strategic planning experience, such as war
planning, that is difficult to duplicate by those not in
uniform. Science, engineering, and business schools all suggest
that their faculties have experience tours so that they can
appreciate the art of the possible. However, due to the
classified nature of military strategic planning, civilians, even
those in government service, seldom participate in some of the
key aspects of joint planning - a key to understanding.
Educating such military strategic planners and managers will
take a skilled faculty with experience in both traditional
military and defense studies as well as corporate-style strategic
management. We also need developed case studies and course
materials that can be used to support such education.
Developmental efforts on both fronts need to begin immediately.
At the same time we must explore the ramifications of
strategic planning ranging from the dangers inherent in greater
centralized authority, especially centralized military authority,
to those inherent in our present decentralized path. If strategic
planning is a viable course of action, and the Military Services,
JCS, and OSD believe it is, then we should begin to map out
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changes to build the foundation on which strategic
planning/management in DoD can rest.
We also should be aware that strategic management assumes
certain necessary and sufficient conditions to be effective.
Among the conditions, but by no means all, are: an agreement on
goals and objectives or at least a mechanism by which the
dominant coalition can develop a consensus on goals and
objectives; a process by which the organization scans its
environment, monitors trends, and assesses its competitors so the
organization can assume and an advantageous posture; control
over the budget process which permits a reallocation of resources
to fit the organization's strategy; a management information
system which evolves into an integrated communication and control
system; and a review and monitoring process to ascertain whether
current strategies are viable or should be revamped.
We need to investigate to what extent do these conditions
obtain in the DoD. While ideally it may be beneficial to
strategically manage DoD, we need to make sure that is it
practically possible given the constraints and conditions of the
current situation. There may be very real obstacles and special
considerations that need to be considered before applying
strategic planning to DoD. The issues of size and
decentralization serve to illustrate that the task will not be an
easy one. Most people would agree that the DoD mission
requires greater integration and coordination, not only in terms
of our military capability, but in terms of the Executive Branch
and all of its attendant offices. Yet the very conditions that
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make strategic planning in business and industry successful are
lacking or underdeveloped in DoD. We are facing a "catch 22":
our current planning efforts are not adequate; we need strategic
management and planning; but we face obstacles and lack the
necessary and sufficient conditions to make either effective.
This are critical issues that need immediate analysis and study.
We also have to recognize the additional disincentives for
strategic planning within DoD, then prepare to neutralize or
offset them. The lack of political guidance and the difficulty
in determining the future were previously addressed. Other
disincentives include "turf" protection, an unwillingness to
expose vulnerabilities, and the lack of a dedicated strategic
management community.
Ultimately, the military must integrate its existing
strategic planning community (oriented toward politico-military
and nuclear issues) and program planning efforts. More
importantly, it should devise a reward structure for the creative
people who can best serve decision-makers by challenging the
existing structure, but from within the system. We caution that
the answers are not to be found by selecting "gurus" as National
Security Affairs Advisors or as cabinet-level positions, nor by
re-defining the role of the National Security Council or its
staff. Although certain organizational and personnel changes are
required to create the environment whereby the DoD could exercise
strategic management, the key to the solution is creating an
interdisciplinary field and manpower specialty within DoD for
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officers who are experts in strategic management/planning for
public institutions.
Strategic planning within the DoD and the Navy offers
exciting possibilities for new concepts and renewed efforts to
enhance the combat potential of the military. There is a long
history of attempted strategic planning by the military. Between
the wars, the services cooperated and developed war plans that
formed the basis for the campaigns that were actually fought in
the Pacific. The Navy once had an extremely good strategic
planning organization, used by the Chief of Naval Operations and
Secretary of the Navy for the purposes described herein. With a
new Administration, we should avail ourselves of the opportunity
to not only assess what our strategic plans are, but, more
importantly, how we go about making those plans and shaping those
individuals who are to serve as strategic planners and managers.
The existing system has created excellent programmers and
adequate politico-military planners but few strategic planners or
strategic managers. It is not likely to educate, socialize,
utilize,, and retain the type of individuals necessary to manage
the conduct of foreign and military affairs in a 21st century
global environment that is unlikely to be like what we have
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